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Abstract
Relative Utilitarianism (RU) is a version of classical utilitarianism, where each
person’s utility function is rescaled to range from zero to one. As a voting system,
RU is vulnerable to preference exaggeration by strategic voters. The Groves-Clarke
Pivotal Mechanism elicits truthful revelation of preferences by requiring each voter
to ‘bid’ a sum of real money to cast a pivotal vote. However, this neglects wealth
effects and gives disproportionate power to rich voters. We propose a variant of the
Pivotal Mechanism using fixed allotments of notional ‘voting money’; this Voting
Money Pivotal Mechanism (VMPM) is politically egalitarian and immune to wealth
effects. In the large-population limit, the only admissible (i.e. weakly undominated)
voting strategies in the VMPM are approximately truthful revelations of preferences;
thus the VMPM yields an arbitrarily close approximation of RU.
Let I be a set of individuals and let A be a set of policy alternatives. Suppose that each
i ∈ I has an ordinal preference relation over A and also over the set of all lotteries between
elements in A. If these lottery preferences satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM)
axioms of minimal rationality, then we can define a cardinal utility function ui : A−→R
such that i’s lottery preferences are consistent with maximization of the expected value of
ui.
A utilitarian social welfare function U : A−→R is one of the form
U(a) :=
∑
i∈I
ciui(a), ∀ a ∈ A, (1)
where ci ∈ R6− are nonnegative constants. Classic Utilitarianism prescribes the policy
alternative a∗ ∈ A which maximizes U . Utilitarianism has several philosophically ap-
pealing mathematical properties, such as those given by Harsanyi’s (1953) Impartial Ob-
server Theorem and (1955) Social Aggregation Theorem. It has also been characterized
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by d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), Maskin (1978), Myerson (1981) and Ng (1975, 1985,
2000) as the only social welfare function satisfying several combinations of axioms encoding
‘fairness’ and ‘rationality’.
However, the von Neumann-Morgenstern cardinal utility functions ui in eqn.(1) are
only well-defined up to affine transformations: if c ∈ R6− and d ∈ R are constants, then the
functions ui and u˜i := cui + d are equally consistent descriptions of the lottery preferences
of individual i. Thus, Classic Utilitarianism suffers from two major problems:
1. There is no a priori reason to choose one set of constants {ci}i∈I versus another.
Equivalently, there is no practical method for making accurate interpersonal com-
parisons of utility. (Indeed, it is not clear that such interpersonal comparisons could
be well-defined, even in principle).
2. A classical utilitarian voting system is vulnerable to manipulation by ‘strategic voters’
who either exaggerate their preferences or misrepresent them in more subtle ways.
One solution to problem #1 is to insist that everyone rescale their personal utility function
so that its range lies in a certain compact interval. Typically, all utilities are rescaled to
range over a unit interval (e.g. from zero to one). In other words, for all i ∈ I, we define
ri := max
a∈A
ui(a) − min
a∈A
ui(a). We then substitute ci := 1/ri in eqn.(1). This version of
utilitarianism has been called Relative Utilitarianism (RU), and admits several appealing
axiomatic characterizations; see Cao (1982), Dhillon (1998), Karni (1998), Dhillon and
Mertens (1999) and Segal (2000).
However, RU is still susceptible to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. The scope
for exaggeration of utilities is limited, but if the electorate is large, then each voter might try
to maximize the influence of her vote by declaring a value of ‘one’ for all the alternatives she
finds acceptable, and value ‘zero’ to all the alternatives she finds unacceptable (especially
on a hard-fought issue). In this case RU devolves into the ‘approval voting’ of Brams
and Fishburn (1983). Approval voting has many nice properties, but it does not satisfy
the same axiomatic characterizations as RU. Furthermore, approval voting is an ‘ordinal’
voting system, so the impossibility theorem of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)
makes it susceptible to further forms of strategic voting.
If the spaceA of alternatives is a convex set of feasible allocations of economic resources,
then Sobel (2001) has shown that the set of Nash equilibria of the resulting ‘utility mis-
representation game’ for RU contains the set of Walrasian equilibria of a pure exchange
economy over these resources with equal initial endowments. However, the misrepresenta-
tion game also admits non-Walrasian Nash equilibria which are not even Pareto efficient.
In this paper, we introduce the Voting Money Pivotal Mechanism (VMPM), a version of
the well-known Groves-Clarke pivotal mechanism which uses a virtual currency of ‘voting
money’. This voting money attains value because each voter must reuse her finite budget
of voting money in a long sequence of consecutive referenda. Voters can still misrepresent
their utilities in the VMPM, but a rational voter would only use a misrepresentation
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strategy which was admissible in the sense that it was not weakly dominated by some
other strategy. We show that, when all voters adopt admissible voting strategies, the
outcome of the VMPM is an approximation of Relative Utilitarianism; furthermore, this
approximation becomes arbitrarily accurate as the number of voters increases to infinity.1
The paper is organized as follows. In §1 we review the standard Groves-Clarke pivotal
mechanism and discuss its properties and drawbacks. In §2 we introduce the VMPM, and
in §3 we prove our main result (Theorem 3). In §4, we sketch a simple protocol to protect
the anonymity of voters. In §5, we propose a system to formulate the referendum ballots
themselves using auctions priced in voting money; we then sketch a formal model of this
‘Ballot Auction’ system. In §6 we review previous work on ‘point-based’ voting systems,
and contrast these systems with the VMPM.
1 The Groves-Clarke Pivotal Mechanism
The Groves-Clarke Pivotal Mechanism (GCPM) is a special case of the demand-revealing
mechanism proposed by Groves (1973) and Clarke (1971), and later promoted by Tideman
and Tullock (1976).2 The GCPM is a hybrid between a referendum and an auction:
1. Each voter i assigns a monetary valuation vi(a) to each alternative a ∈ A. We regard
vi(a) as a proxy for the value of ui(a) in eqn.(1).
2. Society chooses the alternative a ∈ A which maximizes the aggregate valuation:
V (a) :=
∑
i∈I
vi(a). (2)
3. Suppose that voter i is pivotal, meaning that alternative a wins only because of i’s
vote. In other words, V (a) − V (b) < vi(a) − vi(b), so if i had voted differently (i.e.
given a higher valuation to b and/or a lower one to a), then the alternative b would
have won instead. Then voter i must pay a Clarke tax ti defined:
ti :=
∑
j 6=i
[vj(b)− vj(a)]. (3)
Intuitively, [vj(b) − vj(a)] is the ‘net loss’ in utility for voter j because society chose a
instead of b; hence the Clarke tax ti is the ‘aggregate net loss’ for everyone else besides i.
1This is similar in spirit to other results about approximate implementation in large-population limits,
such as Roberts and Postlewaite (1976). However, our paper differs both in its goal and its methods.
2The GCPM is extensively analyzed in the collection by Tideman (1977) and the monograph by Green
and Laffont (1979). See also §8.2 of Moulin (1988), §23.C of Mas-Colell et al. (1995), §5 of Tideman (1997),
and §8.1 of Mueller (2003). Another special case of Groves’ and Clarke’s demand-revealing mechanism
is the Vickrey (1961) auction; for this reason the demand-revealing mechanism is sometimes called the
‘Vickrey-Groves-Clarke mechanism’.
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Note that
ti =
∑
j 6=i
vj(b)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(a) = [V (b)− vi(b)]− [V (a)− vi(a)]
= [vi(a)− vi(b)]− [V (a)− V (b)] ≤ vi(a)− vi(b),
(because V (a) ≥ V (b) by hypothesis). Thus, the Clarke tax never exceeds i’s personal
gain in obtaining a rather than b (assuming she expressed her preferences honestly); hence
i should always be willing to pay the tax ti in order to secure alternative a.
In most cases, the winning alternative will win by a margin of victory which far exceeds
the valuation assigned by any single voter, so that step #3 will only rarely be implemented.
However, in a very close electoral outcome, many voters may find themselves in the position
of the ‘swing’ voter described in step #3 (i.e. each one could have single-handedly changed
the outcome), and in these cases, all these voters must pay a Clarke tax.
Because of this possibility, each voter has a strong incentive to express her preferences
honestly. If she understates her preference for a particular alternative, then she runs the
risk that a less-preferred alternative may be chosen, even though she could have changed the
outcome to her more preferred alternative had she voted honestly (and would have happily
paid the resulting Clarke tax). Conversely, if she overstates her value for a particular
alternative, then she risks paying more than it is worth for her to ‘purchase’ her preferred
outcome. Thus, the GCPM acts as a kind of ‘auction’, where each valuation vi(a) functions
not only as a ‘vote’, but also as a ‘bid’ for the option to change the referendum outcome.
In most cases (e.g. landslide victories), this option will not be exercised, but in a close
race, the option will be exercised, and the voter must pay her bid value. Just as in an
ordinary auction, each voter neither wishes to ‘underbid’ (and risk unnecessary defeat) nor
to ‘overbid’ (and risk paying too much). Her dominant strategy is always to bid honestly.
Formally, we can model the GCPM as a Bayesian game, in which each player i ∈ I
has a (secret) utility function ui : O−→R (where O is some set of outcomes), along with a
strategy set Si, and the outcome of the game is determined by a function o :
∏
i∈I
Si−→O.
Let S−i :=
∏
j∈I\{i}
Sj, and regard o as a function o : Si × S−i−→O. We say si ∈ Si is a
dominant strategy for player i if, for any s−i ∈ S−i,
ui [o(si, s−i)] ≥ ui [o(s′i, s−i)] , ∀ s′i ∈ Si.
In other words, si is an optimal strategy for player i, given any possible choice of strategies
for the other players.
Let V := RA = {v : A−→R} be the set of all monetary valuations of the alternatives in
A. Consider the Bayesian game where Si = V for all i (each player’s strategy is to declare
some valuation in V), and where the outcome of the game is a choice of policy in A, and
some Clarke tax for each player, as determined by the GCPM. In other words, O := A×RI ,
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and for any vector of valuations v = (v1, . . . , vI) ∈
∏
i∈I Si, o(v) := (a; t), where a ∈ A
is the alternative with the highest total valuation, and t := (t1, . . . , tI) ∈ RI is the vector
of Clarke taxes computed using eqn.(3). Suppose that (after perhaps multiplying by a
constant), each voter’s utility function has the quasilinear form
ui(a,−ti) = wi(a)− ti, ∀a ∈ A and ti ∈ R, (4)
where wi : A−→R is her utility function over the policy alternatives and ti is the Clarke
tax she must pay. Then it makes sense to say that wi(a) is the monetary worth which voter
i assigns to alternative a ∈ A. Given assumption (4), the GCPM is a dominant strategy
implementation of utilitarianism in the following sense:
Theorem 1 Suppose all voters have quasilinear utility functions like eqn.(4). Then for
each i ∈ I, a dominant strategy is to set vi := wi. In the resulting dominant strategy
equilibrium, the GCPM chooses the same alternative as utilitarianism (because then max-
imizing V =
∑
i∈I vi is equivalent to maximizing U =
∑
i∈I wi).
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The GCPM also satisfies other appealing axiomatic characterizations, due to Moulin
(1986) and Sjostrom (1991). However, because it links voting to money, the GCPM has
several major caveats:
Caveat #1. Theorem 1 only holds if voters have quasilinear utility functions like eqn.(4).
This is false. Real people are risk-averse, which means their utility is highly concave
as a function of money. At the very least, we should assume utility functions have the
‘quasiconcave’ form
ui(a, ti) = wi(a) + c(Ei + ti), ∀a ∈ A and ti ∈ R, (5)
where c is some concave function (e.g. c = log) and Ei is the initial endowment of player
i (i.e. her current assets, plus the expected present value of all future earnings). But this
leads to further problems:
(a) If c is strictly concave, then the GCPM clearly assigns much more ‘voting power’ to
rich people than poor people. A rich person i might easily be willing to bid $100,000
to change the outcome of the election from a to b, whereas a poor person j would
only bid $100 to change it from b to a, even though wi(a) = wj(b) and wi(b) = wj(a).
(b) If c is nonlinear, then Theorem 1 is false; indeed, a voter may not have any dominant
strategy. For example, suppose A = {a, b, c}, and
wi(a) = 0 < wi(b) = 2 < wi(c) = 4.
3See Proposition 23.C.4 on p.877 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995) or Lemma 8.1 on p.204 of Moulin (1988).
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Suppose c is a concave function such that c(Ei) = 0, c(Ei−$2) = −2 and c(Ei−$3) =
−4. Thus, voter i would be willing to pay a $2 Clarke tax to change outcome a to
outcome b, and also $2 to change outcome b to outcome c, but would only be willing
to pay $3 to change a to c. Suppose voter i declares valuations vi(a) = 0 and vi(c) = 3
(which is a truthful expression of her quasiconcave utility function with respect to a
and c). What valuation should she declare for b? If she declares vi(b) < 2, then she
has ‘undervalued’ b versus a; if a ultimately wins by a margin of less than $2 over
b, then she will regret her choice. However, if she declares vi(b) > 1, then she has
‘overvalued’ b versus c; if b ultimately wins by a margin of less than $2 over c, then
she will still regret her choice.
Suppose, then, that i declares vi(a) = 0, vi(b) = 2, and vi(c) = 4; then she will be
satisfied with any referendum outcome of a vs. b or b vs. c. But suppose c beats a
by a margin between $3 and $4; then i will have to pay a Clarke tax greater than
$3, so once again she will regret her choice. In summary, there is no valuation of
the alternatives {a, b, c} which i will not regret under some circumstances. Her best
strategy depends upon her expectations about how other people will vote. In other
words, she has no dominant strategy.
In this situation, one or more Nash equilibria may still exist (some of which may even
be truth-revealing). But the predictive relevance of a Nash equilibrium depends upon
each voter making accurate predictions about the behaviour of every other voter, and
in a ‘voting game’ involving millions of voters (e.g. a modern democracy) this is not
very plausible.
(c) Like the quasilinear function (4), the quasiconcave function (5) ‘solves’ the problem of
interpersonal utility comparison by implicitly assuming that all people have identical
utility function c for money. This is false. Even if two people have the same initial
endowment, their utility for money may differ. For example, a person with modest
material needs (e.g. an ascetic monk) will assign less utility to each dollar than a
hedonistic playboy. Hence we should assume each person’s utility function has the
form ui(a, ti) = wi(a)+ci(Ei+ti), where ci is some concave function which may differ
from person to person. This further confounds any interpretation of the aggregate
monetary valuation of an alternative as its ‘aggregate utility’.
Good (1977) has proposed a modified pivotal scheme which equalizes voting power
between rich and poor or between ascetics and hedonists. Loosely speaking, we re-
define V (a) :=
∑
i∈I fi[vi(a)] in eqn.(2), where fi[t] := ci [Ei] − ci [Ei − t] measures
the disutility of t lost dollars for voter i (for example, if the function ci is linear with
slope λi, then this simplifies to V (a) :=
∑
i∈I λivi(a), where presumably the marginal
utilities λi are smaller for rich people and larger for poor people). The problem, of
course, is to estimate the functions fi; clearly each person has considerable incentive
to misrepresent her marginal utility. Good proposes we use some standard function
like fi(t) = t/Ei, but this seems somewhat procrustean. Also, the proof that Good’s
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mechanism is a dominant-strategy truthful implementation of utilitarianism still im-
plicitly assumes that voter’s utility functions are quasilinear, so it is vulnerable to
Caveat #1(b).
Tideman (1997) has proposed that Clarke taxes be paid in time (spent, say, in com-
munity service) rather than money. This gives the poor the same a priori political
power as the rich, but it is still far from egalitarian. Different people value their time
very differently. The retired and the unemployed have a lot of spare time (and hence,
presumably, assign a low marginal utility to this time), whereas working parents and
jet-setting professionals have almost no time to spare.
(d) Even the individualized quasiconcave utility functions in #1(c) assume that each
person’s preferences over the alternatives in A are totally separable from her wealth
level Ei. This is false. For example, rich people and poor people have very different
preferences concerning redistributive taxation schemes and publicly funded goods.
Caveat #2. Any revenue collected by the Clarke tax must be removed from the economy
(e.g. destroyed or donated to a faraway country), because otherwise voters who expect not
to pay a Clarke tax have an incentive to distort their valuations so as to inflate the amount
of revenue which is collected; see (Riker, 1982, p.54) for example. Thus, the GCPM is
never Pareto-efficient.
Caveat #3. As (Riker, 1982, p.56) notes, pivotal voting cannot be anonymous, because
to implement the Clarke tax, we need a public record of each person’s valuations of the
alternatives. However, anonymity of voting is a crucial feature of modern democracy.
Anonymity protects voters from discrimination and political extortion, and also prevents
voters from selling their votes for material gain. The GCPM is clearly vulnerable to a
scam where I pay a thousand people $5 each to declare a valuation of $100 for a particular
outcome. If this outcome then wins by a ‘landslide’ margin of $100,000 (or indeed, by any
margin greater than $100), then none of my accomplices needs to pay the Clarke tax (so
they each profit $5), and the total cost for me is only $5,000 (which is much cheaper than
personally paying a $100,000 Clarke tax to swing the outcome in my favour).
2 The Voting Money Pivotal Mechanism
To resolve these problems, we propose a modified Pivotal Mechanism, where people post
anonymous valuations using a virtual, nontransferable currency we call ‘voting money’.
We call this the Voting Money Pivotal Mechanism (VMPM):
• Everyone in society starts with exactly the same initial endowment of voting money
(e.g. everyone starts with 100 ‘voting cents’, which make one ‘voting dollar’). Your
7
voting money is held in an an anonymous4 escrow account, from which it is not
transferable (so you can’t sell, lend, or give your votes to anyone else). The only
way you can ‘spend’ voting money is by paying a Clarke tax. The only way you
obtain voting money is that, after you pay a Clarke tax, your voting money account
is automatically but very gradually replenished (e.g. at a rate of one cent per week)
until it returns to its initial amount (e.g. $1.00).
• Voting money can be used to vote in regular (e.g. weekly) referenda to decide public
policy questions.
• When you vote, the amount currently in your account must be sufficient to pay any
Clarke tax you might incur —i.e. it must equal the largest difference between your
valuations of any pair of alternatives. (In particular, this means we can assume that
your valuations for each alternative are always between $0 and $1.00).
• After each referendum, the Electoral Commission (EC) aggregates the valuations
of all voters, and computes the total valuation for each alternative. The EC then
publicly announces these totals. As in the GCPM, the alternative with the highest
total valuation is chosen.
• The EC computes Clarke taxes for each voter, as in eqn.(3). The EC then debits
your voting money account of any Clarke tax you owe.
In §3, we will show that each voter assigns nonzero value to her voting money (because
she must reuse it in successive referenda), so that Clarke taxes create a nontrivial incentive
for truth revelation. Furthermore, we will show that, under reasonable assumptions, each
voter’s utility function is approximately quasilinear in voting money, which yields Theorem
3, an approximate version of Theorem 1. First, we will briefly discuss how the VMPM
obviates some of the caveats we earlier identified for the Groves-Clarke pivotal mechanism.
To neutralize Caveat #2, note that all Clarke taxes are paid in a virtual currency
with no real economic value (the only value of voting money is its influence on VMPM
referenda). Thus, the ‘destruction’ of Clarke tax revenues does not imply any Pareto
inefficiency in real economic resources.
To dispel Caveat #1(a), observe that there is no disparity in voting power between
rich and poor, because everyone has the same initial ‘wealth’ in voting money and the
same ‘future earning potential’. Someone may temporarily become ‘poor’ if she pays
a large Clarke tax, but this ‘poverty’ disappears fairly quickly because her account is
automatically replenished at some constant rate. To obviate Caveat #1(d), note that a
person’s endowment of voting money has no influence on her policy preferences, because
her voting money endowment has no relation to her role in society or her real economic
status. Finally, to neutralize Caveat #1(c), note that voting money can only be spent on
political action, not on physical goods. A single voting cent represents exactly the same
4See §4.
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amount of political power for each person, and all voters receive the same endowment of
voting money. Thus, if all voters as have the same intensity of preferences over policy
alternatives (which is the implicit assumption of Relative Utilitarianism), then a single
voting cent has exactly the same utility to for each voter.
We will address Caveat #3 in §4. Caveat #1(b) is addressed by Lemma 2 in the next
section.
3 Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitari-
anism
It remains to show that each voter assigns nontrivial (but approximately quasilinear) utility
to her voting money, so that something like Theorem 1 is true. To begin, note that the
value of a quantity of voting money is the expected increase in utility it yields when spent
in a strategically optimal manner to influence the outcome of future referenda. We will
argue that, in the limit as the population size I tends to infinity, the expected utility gained
in this fashion from a quantity x of voting money is a linear function of x.
After the current referendum A0, there will be an infinite sequence of further referenda
with alternative sets A1,A2,A3, . . .. Voter i is trying to decide how much money to risk on
the current referendumA0, and how much to reserve for these future referenda. Recall that,
whenever i’s voting money account is depleted by a Clarke tax, it is slowly replenished up
to some maximum —say E voting dollars. Suppose that, after each referendum, a depleted
account is replenished with E/N voting dollars, for some N ∈ N.5 Thus, any Clarke tax
which i pays in referendum A0 will be totally replenished after at most N referenda; thus,
her voting strategy in A0 will affect her future voting power only in referenda A1, . . . ,AN .
Assume the alternative sets A1, . . . ,AN are disjoint, and let A :=
N⊔
n=1
An. If m > 0,
then any element of [0,m]A represents some valuation of between 0 and m voting dollars
for each alternative of the future referendum An, for every n ∈ [1...N ]. Thus, if society
has I individuals, each with an initial endowment of E dollars, then the set of possible
collective valuations is [0, IE]A. For simplicity, we could set E := 1. However, to represent
the proportionate influence of each individual voter (which becomes infinitesimally small as
I becomes large), it is convenient to treat each voter as having an endowment of E := 1/I,
so that the set of collective valuations is normalized to [0, 1]A.
Thus, a vector in [0, 1]A represents an aggregate valuation of each element of A by
society, and hence, implicitly determines an outcome for each of the next N referenda.
Let B := ∏Nn=1An. Thus, an element b = (b1, b2, . . . , bN) ∈ B represents a ‘bundle’ of
policies determined by outcomes of the next N referenda. We assume that i has vNM
utility function βi : B−→R. Define the outcome function o : [0, 1]A−→B so that, for every
5For a discussion of how to set the parameter N , see Remark 9(R)[i] below.
9
bundle b ∈ B,
o−1{b} :=
{
x ∈ [0, 1]A ; ∀n ∈ [1...N ], ∀ a ∈ An, xbn ≥ xa
}
is the set of all aggregate valuations such that alternative b1 wins the first referendum, b2
wins the second referendum, etc. Define β˜i := βi ◦o : [0, 1]A−→R; hence β˜i(x) is the utility
for voter i of the bundle of future referendum outcomes determined by collective valuation
x.
Voter i cannot completely predict the outcome of the next N referenda, but she can
make an educated guess, based on her knowledge of the distribution of preferences in her
society. Thus, let fi : RA−→R6− be a probability density function (supported on [0, 1]A),
such that, for any measurable subset Y ⊂ [0, 1]A, ∫
Y
f(y) dy is the subjective probability
(as seen by voter i) that aggregate valuation of all other voters will lie in Y. In particular,
this means that her subjective expected utility (before voting) is given by∫
RA
β˜i(x)fi(x) dx. (6)
We make the following assumptions:
(D) fi is twice differentiable, and ‖∂a∂bfi‖1 < ∞ for all a, b ∈ A. (Here, ‖g‖1 :=∫
RA |g(x)| dx).
(S) Let ui : A0×B−→R be individual i’s vNM utility function over all bundles of policies
in the referenda A0,A1, . . . ,AN . Then ui has the ‘separable’ form:
ui(a0, a1, . . . , an) = αi(a0) + βi(a1, . . . , an), (7)
where αi : A0−→R is her vNM utility function for referendum A0 and βi : B−→R is
her vNM utility function for all the remaining referenda, as above.
(I) For each voter i, the functions fi, αi and βi do not depend on I (the number of other
voters).
Lemma 2 Assume (D), (S), and (I). For all a0 ∈ A0 and t ∈ [0, 1], let Ui(a,−t) be
voter i’s cardinal utility when society chooses policy a0 and i pays a Clarke tax of t voting
dollars. Then
Ui(a0,−t) = wi(a0) − mi(t), (8)
where wi : A0−→R is a scalar multiple of αi, and where mi : [−1, 1]−→R is an increasing
function such that mi(0) = 0 and
mi(t) = t ± O(hit2/I). (9)
Here, I is the number of voters; hi ≥ 0 is constant not depending on I; and “O(hit2/I)”
represents some function such that |O(hit2/I)| ≤ |hit2/I| for all t ∈ [−1, 1] and I ∈ N. 2
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Heuristically speaking, if I is sufficiently large (e.g. a democracy of several million
people), then the error term O(hit2/I) will be extremely small, so Lemma 2 says each
voter’s utility function ui will be very close to the quasilinear form (4). Hence, wi(a)
roughly measures the ‘worth’ (in voting money) of alternative a to voter i. However,
this doesn’t mean that her dominant strategy will be truthful revelation (as in Theorem
1), because if ui diverges even a little from being quasilinear, then voter i might have no
dominant strategy [as in Caveat #1(b)]. Nevertheless, if I is large, then the only admissible
strategies for i are the ‘approximately honest’ ones (see Corollary 6 below). To show this,
we require one further assumption about the range of wi and mi:
(R) Suppose i has the utility function ui(a,−t) = wi(a) − mi(t) as in eqn.(8). Then
|wi(a)− wi(b)| ∈ mi[0, 1] for all a, b ∈ A.
If the hypotheses of Lemma 2 are satisfied, then mi(t) ≈ t for all t ∈ [0, 1], so that
mi[0, 1] ≈ [0, 1]. In this case, assumption (R) is roughly equivalent to stipulating that
max
a∈A
wi(a) − min
a∈A
wi(a) ≤ 1.
A valuation strategy (or ‘voting strategy’) for voter i in the VMPM is a function
vi : A0−→[0, 1] which declares a valuation (in voting money) for each alternative in A0.
(Presumably this valuation should reflect i’s utility function wi, but it may not.) Thus, i’s
strategy set is Vi := [0, 1]A. Let V−i :=
∏
i6=j∈I
Vj. For any v−i = (vj) j∈I
j 6=i
∈ V−i and a ∈ A,
we define v−i(a) :=
∑
i6=j∈I
vj(a). Let a be the element of A maximizing v−i(a) [i.e. the
outcome of a referendum involving everyone except i]. If vi ∈ Vi, then let b be the element
of A maximizing vi(b) + v−i(b), and let t := v−i(a)− v−i(b) be the resulting Clarke tax (if
a = b, then t = 0). Thus,
Ui(vi,v−i) := wi(b)−mi(t)
is the utility of the valuation strategy vi for voter i, given the profile v−i of opposing
strategies. If vi, vi ∈ Vi, then vi weakly dominates vi if, for any v−i ∈ V−i, Ui(vi,v−i) ≥
Ui(vi,v−i), and this inequality is strict for some v−i ∈ V−i. That is: regardless of the
strategies of the other voters, the outcome of vi (i.e. the referendum winner and resulting
Clarke tax) is always at least as good for i as the outcome of vi, and is strictly better than
vi for some possible strategies by other voters.
The valuation strategy vi is admissible if it is not weakly dominated by any other
valuation strategy. This is a weak condition, and voter i may have many admissible
strategies. However, it is clearly irrational for her to use any inadmissible strategy. For
example, suppose vi ∈ Vi was inadmissible, and weakly dominated by vi. Let ρ be any
probability measure on V−i. Then∫
V−i
Ui(vi,v−i) dρ[v−i] ≤
∫
V−i
Ui(vi,v−i) dρ[v−i].
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If ρ has full support on V−i, then this inequality is strict. Hence i’s expected utility is
never maximized by an inadmissible valuation strategy.
If  > 0 and x, y ∈ R, then “x
˜
y” means |x− y| < . Our main result is this:
Theorem 3 Assume (D), (S), (I) and (R), and fix  > 0. For all i ∈ I, let voter i
have utility function wi : A0−→R as in Lemma 2, and let vi : A0−→[0, 1] be any valuation
strategy that is admissible for i. Let
W :=
1
I
∑
i∈I
wi : A0−→R and V := 1
I
∑
i∈I
vi : A0−→[0, 1]
be, respectively, the average utility function and the average valuation of all voters. If I is
sufficiently large, then:
(a) There is a constant K ∈ R such that W (a)
˜
V (a) +K for all a ∈ A0.
(b) Thus, if a∗ ∈ A0 maximizes W and b∗ ∈ A0 maximizes V , then V (a∗) ˜ V (b∗).
In other words, in the large population limit, the VMPM induces all voters to declare
valuations such that the outcome yields an average social utility within  of the optimal
outcome specified by Relative Utilitarianism. (Presumably, much of the time, the refer-
endum outcome is actually identical to that of RU. However, the outcome itself is less
important than the aggregate utility level which we achieve.)
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose voter i had an unlimited budget, and could declare any
valuations she wanted for the alternatives in the future referenda A1, . . . ,AN . If voter i
declared a valuation vector v ∈ RA, then she would translate the density function fi in
expression (6) by the vector v; hence her expected utility (after voting) would be∫
RA
β˜i(x)fi(x− v) dx.
This means that the expected gain in her utility obtained by declaring v would be
γi(v) :=
∫
RA
β˜i(x)fi(x− v) dx−
∫
RA
β˜i(x)fi(x) dx
=
∫
RA
β˜i(x)
[
fi(x− v)− fi(x)
]
dx.
This defines a nonlinear, smooth function γi : RA−→R, which we will approximate with
a first-order Taylor expansion. Observe that γi(0) = 0. Define
g := ∇γi(0) = −
∫
RA
β˜i(x)∇fi(x) ∈ RA, and ĥi := max
a,b∈A
‖∂a∂bγi‖∞.
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(Here, ‖γ‖∞ := sup
x∈RA
|γ(x)|). Assumption (D) says that g is well-defined. Also,
ĥi ≤
(∗)
∥∥∥β˜i∥∥∥∞ · maxa,b∈A ‖∂a∂bf‖1 <(†) ∞.
where (∗) is the Ho¨lder inequality and (†) is by assumption (D).
Now recall that i only has a small endowment, and that 1/I is the weight of i’s endow-
ment, divided by the population size. Then her set of feasible future valuation vectors
is actually V := [0, 1/I]A (assuming she never has to pay a Clarke tax). If v ∈ V and
t ∈ R, then the multivariate Taylor inequality and assumption (D) imply:
γi(tv) = γi(0) + 〈tv,∇γi(0)〉 ± O(ĥit2|v|2) = t〈v,g〉 ± O(ĥit2/I2). (10)
Thus, for any t ∈ [0, 1], the optimal deployment of t voting dollars for i is the valuation
vector tv, where v ∈ V is the vector in V which maximizes t〈v,g〉. Let ||g||∞ :=
maxa∈A |ga|; then v := g/(I||g||∞) (independent of t). Let ||g||22 :=
∑
a∈A |ga|2 and let
ki := ||g||22/||g||∞; then 〈v,g〉 = ki/I, so t〈v,g〉 = tki/I.
Thus, m̂i(t) := γi(tv) is the utility for i of t voting dollars: the increase in expected
utility when t dollars are deployed optimally in future referenda (voting money has
no other value, because it is not transferable and cannot be spent on physical goods).
Substituting into eqn.(10), we get
m̂i(t) := γi(tv) = kit/I ±O(ĥit2/I2).
This, combined with hypothesis (S), yields a combined utility function Ûi : A0×R−→R
of the form
Ûi(a0,−t) = αi(a0) + m̂i(−t) = αi(a0)− kit/I ±O(ĥit2/I2).
Finally, since vNM cardinal utilities are equivalent up to affine transformations, we can
divide Ûi and m̂i by the scalar (ki/I) to get an equivalent utility function Ui(a0,−t) =
wi(a0)−mi(t), where wi(a0) := Iαi(a0)/ki and mi(t) := −t±O(hit2/I), and hi := ĥi/ki.
2
If the quasilinear approximation in Lemma 2 was exact (i.e. ifmi(t) = t for all t ∈ [0, 1]),
then i’s ‘truthful’ valuation strategy would be vi = wi + k (where k is any constant), so
that
vi(a)− vi(b) = wi(a)− wi(b) for all a, b ∈ A.
More generally, if ui(a,−t) = wi(a) − mi(t) as in Lemma 2, then a ‘truthful’ valuation
strategy would be any vi such that
vi(a)− vi(b) = m−1 [wi(a)− wi(b)] , for all a, b ∈ A. (11)
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[Recall that mi is an increasing function, hence invertible, so assumption (R) implies that
the right-hand side of eqn.(11) is well-defined.] However, if mi is a nonlinear function,
and A has more than two elements, then it is generally impossible for vi to simultaneously
satisfy eqn.(11) for all possible pairs a, b ∈ A —see Caveat #1(b). Fortunately, Lemma 2
says that mi is still ‘approximately’ linear, so we could still try to ‘approximately’ satisfy
eqn.(11). If vi ∈ Vi, then for any a, b ∈ A, we define the discrepancy
δvi(a, b) := vi(a)− vi(b)−m−1 [wi(a)− wi(b)] .
Heuristically, i’s ‘honest’ valuation strategy is one which minimizes these discrepancies.
Let vi, vi ∈ Vi. We write “δvi δvi” if, for all a, b ∈ A,
sign(δvi(a, b)) = sign(δvi(a, b)) and |δvi(a, b)| ≤ |δvi(a, b)| . (12)
We write “δvi  δvi” if this inequality is strict for some a, b ∈ A.
Lemma 4 Let vi, vi ∈ Vi. If δvi  δvi, then vi weakly dominates vi.
Proof: Let v−i ∈ V−i. For any a ∈ A, recall that v−i(a) :=
∑
i6=j∈I
vj(a). Let a be the
element of A maximizing v−i(a), and let c ∈ A, c 6= a. Thus, v−i(a) ≥ v−i(c). Let b be
the element of A maximizing vi(b) + v−i(b) and let b be the element of A maximizing
vi(b) + v−i(b). There are three cases.
Case 1: (v−i(a)− v−i(c) > 1)
In this case, i’s vote can make no difference to the outcome, so b = a = b and hence
Ui(vi,v−i) = wi(a) = Ui(vi,v−i).
Case 2: (m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] < v−i(a)− v−i(c) ≤ 1)
In this case, either wi(c) < wi(a) [i.e. i actually prefers a over c] or wi(a) > wi(c),
but i’s utility improvement from a to c is not worth the Clarke tax of [v−i(a)− v−i(c)]
that she must pay to achieve it. Hence i’s goal is not to overbid. Equation (12) implies
that the quantity [vi(c)− vi(a)] is always closer to m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] than the quantity
[vi(c)− vi(a)]. Thus, one of four subcases occurs:
(2a) vi(c)− vi(a) ≤ vi(c)− vi(a) ≤ m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] ≤ v−i(a)− v−i(c).
(2b) m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] ≤ vi(c)− vi(a) ≤ vi(c)− vi(a) ≤ v−i(a)− v−i(c).
(2c) m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] ≤ vi(c)− vi(a) ≤ v−i(a)− v−i(c) ≤ vi(c)− vi(a).
(2d) m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] ≤ v−i(a)− v−i(c) ≤ vi(c)− vi(a) ≤ vi(c)− vi(a).
These four subcases yield the following outcomes:
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(2a) and (2b): b = a = b, and there are no Clarke taxes, so Ui(vi,v−i) = wi(a) =
Ui(vi,v−i).
(2c): b = a but b = c. Thus, vi incurs no tax, but vi incurs a tax of v−i(a)− v−i(c), so
Ui(vi,v−i) = wi(a) >
(∗)
wi(c)−mi [v−i(a)− v−i(c)] = Ui(vi,v−i).
Here, (∗) is because wi(c)− wi(a) < mi [v−i(a)− v−i(c)], because mi is increasing
and because m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] < v−i(a)− v−i(c) by the hypothesis of Case 2.
(2d): b = c = b, so both vi and vi incur the same Clarke tax, so that Ui(vi,v−i) =
wi(c)−mi [v−i(a)− v−i(c)] = Ui(vi,v−i).
In every subcase, Ui(vi,v−i) ≥ Ui(vi,v−i), and in subcase (2c) this inequality is strict.
Case 3: (m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] ≥ v−i(a)− v−i(c) ≥ 0)
In this case, wi(c) ≥ wi(a), and the utility improvement for i from a to c is worth the
Clarke tax of [v−i(a)− v−i(c)] that she must pay to achieve it. Hence i’s goal is not to
underbid. Equation (12) implies that one of four subcases occurs:
(3a) vi(c)− vi(a) ≥ vi(c)− vi(a) ≥ m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] ≥ v−i(a)− v−i(c).
(3b) m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] ≥ vi(c)− vi(a) ≥ vi(c)− vi(a) ≥ v−i(a)− v−i(c).
(3c) m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] ≥ vi(c)− vi(a) ≥ v−i(a)− v−i(c) ≥ vi(c)− vi(a).
(3d) m−1i [wi(c)− wi(a)] ≥ v−i(a)− v−i(c) ≥ vi(c)− vi(a) ≥ vi(c)− vi(a).
These four subcases yield the following outcomes:
(3a) and (3b): b = c = b, so both vi and vi incur the same Clarke tax, so Ui(vi,v−i) =
wi(c)−mi [v−i(a)− v−i(c)] = Ui(vi,v−i).
(3c): b = c but b = a. Thus, vi incurs no tax, but vi incurs a tax of v−i(a)−v−i(c), so
Ui(vi,v−i) = wi(c)−mi [v−i(a)− v−i(c)] ≥
(∗)
wi(a) = Ui(vi,v−i).
here (∗) is because wi(c) − wi(a) ≥ mi [v−i(a)− v−i(c)], because mi is increasing
and by the hypothesis of Case 3.
(3d): b = a = b, and there are no Clarke taxes, so Ui(vi,v−i) = wi(a) = Ui(vi,v−i).
Again, in every subcase, Ui(vi,v−i) ≥ Ui(vi,v−i). 2
The relation  is a partial ordering on Vi. A valuation strategy is called discrepancy-
minimizing if it is minimal with respect to  .
Lemma 5 For any vi ∈ Vi, there is some discrepancy-minimizing vi ∈ Vi such that vi vi.
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Proof: The ordering  is continuous with respect to the topology of Vi = [0, 1]A. Hence
for any vi ∈ Vi, the set C = {v′i ; v′i vi} is closed. Furthermore, Vi is compact, so C is
compact, so C has a  -minimal element. 2
Corollary 6 Any admissible valuation strategy is discrepancy-minimizing.
Proof: If vi ∈ Vi is not discrepancy-minimizing. Then Lemma 5 yields some vi ∈ Vi with
vi  vi. Then Lemma 4 says that vi weakly dominates vi, so vi is not admissible. 2
It follows that a rational voter will only declare discrepancy-minimizing valuations.
Note that i may prefer different discrepancy-minimizing valuations, depending upon her
subjective probability estimates for the valuations of other players. However, as I becomes
large, every discrepancy-minimizing valuation looks very close to wi plus a constant, and
in this sense, the VMPM induces ‘honest’ voting by all voters:
Proposition 7 Assume (D), (S) and (I), so that i has vNM utility function Ui(a,−t) =
wi(a)−mi(t) as in Lemma 2. Also assume (R), and fix  > 0. If I is large enough, then for
any discrepancy-minimizing vi ∈ Vi, there is some constant ki ∈ R so that vi(a) ˜ wi(a)+ki
for all a ∈ A.
Proof: Let A := #(A), let η := 
2(3A+1)
, and let θ := η/3. If I is large enough, then Lemma
2 implies that mi(t) θ˜ t, for all t ∈ [0, 1]. It follows immediately that
m−1i (r) θ˜ r, for all r ∈ mi[0, 1]. (13)
From this we deduce the following ‘approximate cocycle’ properties for discrepancies:
Claim 1: Let v ∈ Vi. Then:
(a) For all a, b, c ∈ A, δv(a, c)
η˜
δv(a, b) + δv(b, c).
(b) For all a, b ∈ A, δv(a, b)
η˜
− δv(b, a).
Proof: (a) δv(a, c) := v(a)− v(c)−m−1i [wi(a)− wi(c)]
θ˜
v(a)− v(c)− [wi(a)− wi(c)]
= v(a)− v(b) + v(b)− v(c)− [wi(a)− wi(b) + wi(b)− wi(c)]
= v(a)− v(b)− [wi(a)− wi(b)] + v(b)− v(c)− [wi(b)− wi(c)]
2˜θ
v(a)− v(b)−m−1i [wi(a)− wi(b)] + v(b)− v(c)−m−1i [wi(b)− wi(c)]
=: δv(a, b) + δv(b, c).
Here, both “∼” are by eqn.(13). Thus, δv(a, c)
3˜θ
δv(a, b) + δv(b, c). But 3θ = η.
(b) δv(a, b) + δv(b, a)
η˜
δv(a, a) = 0 by (a). 3 Claim 1
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If v ∈ Vi, then a v-partition of A is a pair of nonempty disjoint subsets B, C ⊂ A such
that A = B unionsq C, and such that, for all b ∈ B and c ∈ C, δv(b, c) > 0.
Claim 2: If A can be v-partitioned, then v is not discrepancy-minimizing.
Proof: Suppose A = B unionsq C is a v-partition. Then µ := min
b∈B, c∈C
δv(b, c) > 0 (because B
and C are finite). Define v′ ∈ Vi as follows:
∀ b ∈ B, v′(b) := v(b)− µ/2.
∀ c ∈ C, v′(c) := v(c).
Thus, δv′(b1, b2) = δv(b1, b2) for all b1, b2 ∈ B, and δv′(c1, c2) = δv(c1, c2) for all c1, c2 ∈
C. But for any b ∈ B and c ∈ C, we have 0 < δv′(b, c) = δv(b, c) − µ/2 < δv(b, c).
Thus, δv′  δv, so v is not discrepancy-minimizing. 3 Claim 2
Let V i() := {vi ∈ Vi ; |δvi(a, b)| < /2, ∀ a, b ∈ A}.
Claim 3: Every discrepancy-minimizing valuation is in V i().
Proof: By contradiction, suppose v 6∈ V i(). Then v(b, c) ≥ /2 for some b, c ∈ A. Recall
that η = /2(3A+ 1).
Claim 3.1: There is some k ∈ [1...A] such that A = B unionsq C, where
C := {c′ ∈ A ; δv(c′, c) < 3kη},
and B := {b′ ∈ A ; δv(b′, c) ≥ 3(k + 1)η}.
Proof: For all k ∈ [1...A], let Ak := {a ∈ A ; 3(k − 1)η ≤ δv(a, c) < 3kη}. Note
that b is not in any of these sets (because v(b, c) ≥ /2 = (3A + 1)η). Thus,⊔A
k=1Ak ⊂ A \ {b} is a union of A disjoint sets, but it contains at most A − 1
elements. Thus, the Pigeonhole Principle says Ak = ∅ for some k ∈ [1...A]. Thus,
if B and C are defined as above, then A = B unionsq C. O Claim 3.1
Claim 3.2: B unionsq C is a v-partition of A.
Proof: First note that both B and C are nonempty, because b ∈ B and c ∈ C. Now,
let b′ ∈ B and c′ ∈ C. Then
δv(b′, c′)
η˜
δv(b′, c) + δv(c, c′)
η˜
δv(b′, c)− δv(c′, c)
> 3(k + 1)η − 3kη = 3η,
where the first “
η˜
” is by Claim 1(a), the second “
η˜
” is by Claim 1(b), and “>” is
by definition of B and C. Thus, δv(b′, c′) > 3η− 2η = η > 0, as desired. O Claim 3.2
Claims 2 and 3.2 together imply that v is not discrepancy-minimizing. By contradic-
tion, if v is discrepancy-minimizing, then v ∈ V i(). 3 Claim 3
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Now suppose vi is discrepancy-minimizing. Fix b ∈ A and let ki := vi(b)− wi(b). Then
for any other a ∈ A,
vi(a)− (wi(a) + ki) = vi(a)− vi(b)− [wi(a)− wi(b)]
˜/2
m−1i [wi(a)− wi(b)]− [wi(a)− wi(b)]
θ˜
[wi(a)− wi(b)]− [wi(a)− wi(b)] = 0.
Here, “
˜/2
” is because vi ∈ V i() by Claim 3; and “ θ˜ ” is by eqn.(13).
Thus, vi(a) ˜ wi(a) + ki for all a ∈ A (because /2 + θ < ). 2
Proof of Theorem 3: Corollary 6 implies that any rational voter i ∈ I will declare a
discrepancy-minimizing valuation vi ∈ Vi. Proposition 7 says that, for each i ∈ I, there
is some constant ki such that vi ˜ wi + ki. Let K :=
1
I
∑
i∈I ki. The result follows. 2
Remark 8: (a) The ‘quasilinear approximation’ in Lemma 2 depends on the idea that
each voter can exert only an ‘infinitesimal’ influence over the referendum outcome. Thus,
Theorem 3 does not apply if either:
1. The population of voters is relatively small, or
2. Some voter has a disproportionately large amount of voting money.
This has two implications:
1. Theorem 3 is only applicable to large-population referenda, and not to small com-
mittees.
2. It is vitally important to strictly limit the amount of voting money any single voter
can accumulate. This is why we stipulated that voting money must be nontransfer-
able, and it should only be obtainable through some government-provided ‘income’,
and only up to some modest maximum endowment per voter.
(b) Note that we do not assume that the probability density function fi in equation (6)
is a correct or consistent description of the behaviour of other voters (we are not looking for
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium). The point of Lemma 2 is that as long as voter i predicts the
future voting behaviour of other voters with some probability density function satisfying
(D), (S), and (I), she will assign quasilinear utility to her voting money. Corollary 6 then
says that, in fact, it doesn’t really matter what prediction i makes about the other voters;
her admissible valuation strategies will always be discrepancy-minimizing, and hence (by
Proposition 7) very close to truthful preference revelation. (In particular, of course, this
will be true in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium.)
(c) Strictly speaking, Theorem 3 only yields an ‘-approximation’ of Relative Utilitari-
anism. There are two other ways in which VMPM may deviate from RU:
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• Not all voters will have the same endowment of voting money, because some may be
temporarily impoverished by Clarke taxes levied in previous referenda. In this case,
the VMPM yields a weighted utilitarianism, where each voter’s ‘weight’ is her current
endowment.
Such impoverishment will be an infrequent, because Clarke taxes will rarely be levied
except in very close races. However, even when such impoverishment does occur, it is
arguably ‘fair’, because a voter would only be impoverished if she had recently been
pivotal in one or more closely fought referenda.
• If voter i is somewhat apathetic about referendumA0, then it is likely that max
a∈A0
wi(a) −
min
a∈A0
wi(a) < 1, whereas technically, RU requires all voters’ utility functions to range
over the entire unit interval. In this sense, the VMPM technically fails to implement
RU when confined to a single referendum. However, if we instead consider voter i’s
‘extended’ utility function ui :
∏N
n=0An−→R over all the set of all referenda simul-
taneously, then the VMPM effectively normalizes ui to range over the unit interval
(i.e. the size of voter i’s endowment). Hence, in this long term sense, the VMPM
does implement RU.
Remark 9: In Caveat #1, we complained that Theorem 1 requires the highly dubious
assumption that all voters have quasilinear utility functions like (4) with respect to real
money. We have replaced this dubious assumption with assumptions (D), (S), (I) and
(R). Are these assumptions not equally dubious?
(D) This is an assumption about voter i’s subjective probability estimates concerning
future referenda —in other words, it is an assumption about her psychology. To the extent
that it is psychologically plausible to model a voter as rationally maximizing her expected
utility with respect to some well-defined subjective probability density function, it seems
just as plausible to assume that this subjective probability density functions has the nice
properties specified by (D).
(S) This assumption simply translates the ‘separability’ property of the monetary util-
ity function (4) into an analogous separability property for joint utility functions over
multiple political issues. Clearly such a separability assumption is false: a decision on one
political issue may affect your stance on other issues. However:
• Although your joint utility function over multiple political issues is not completely
separable, it is arguably much more separable than your joint utility function over
political issues and personal wealth level.
• Governments must consider issues one at a time. Thus, eventually, every social choice
mechanism must act as if people’s preferences on different issues are separable.
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If issue nonseparability is a serious concern, then one solution is to define the referenda
over ‘bundles’ of policies which simultaneously encompass several nonseparable issues.
(I) This assumption just says that voter i understands the Law of Large Numbers.
Based on her knowledge of her own culture, she estimates a certain subjective probability
for statements like, “More than 60% of voters in my society would strongly prefer policy a
to policy b”. If I is a sufficiently large random sample of these voters, then voter i would
estimate the same subjective probability for the statement, “More than 60% of voters in I
would strongly prefer policy a to policy b”. Her subjective probability estimate will be the
same, whether I contains 100 000 voters or 100 000 000 voters. In other words, fi does
not depend on I.
(R) This assumption means that voter i can accurately express her preferences between
the alternatives in A by using monetary valuations within her endowment limit [0, 1]. This
is true as long as the constant ki in the proof of Lemma 2 is large enough —in other words,
as long as i assigns roughly the same importance to her participation in foreseeable future
referenda as she does to the present referendum. If i feels much more intensely about
the present referendum than she does about foreseeable future referenda, or if she believes
that these future referenda will all be landslides where her own vote is irrelevant, then
assumption (R) will fail. In this case, she will chose an ‘extreme’ valuation strategy on
A0, which bids her whole endowment for some alternatives (and nothing for others), but
this valuation will still be insufficient to adequately express the intensity of her preferences
over A0.
To obviate this problem, we must make value of voting money large enough for each
person that she can always fully convey the intensity of her preferences using valuations
within her endowment. There are two ways to do this:
[i] By slowing the replenishment rate of depleted endowments, we can extend the ‘referen-
dum horizon’ N of each voter far into the future. Thus, each voter can always foresee
the possibility of future referenda in which her participation is at least as important
to her as the present referendum. A Clarke tax incurred on the present referendum
would inhibit her influence on these future referenda; this will make the constant ki
in Lemma 2 large enough to verify assumption (R).
[ii] By making voting money fungible for some other kind of political influence, we can
increase its value enough to verify assumption (R).
Method [i] suggests a natural feedback mechanism: if we observe too many voters declaring
‘extreme’ valuations, then this means that assumption (R) is failing because these voters
are discounting future referenda too much. This means their voting money endowments
are being replenished too quickly, so we can slow the replenishment rate until the frequency
of extreme valuations drops to an acceptable level.
Method [ii] suggests combining the VMPM with some other form of political partici-
pation. We will do this in §5.
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4 Anonymity in the Pivotal Mechanism
Caveat #3 of the Groves-Clarke Pivotal Mechanism was its lack of anonymity. In this
section we propose a protocol which uses public key cryptography and an intermediating
layer of ‘brokers’ to to preserve the anonymity of pivotal mechanism voting. (This protocol
applies equally to the GCPM and the VMPM, but obviously we have in mind the latter).
In a public key cryptosystem, a message is encrypted using an encryption key ke, but
can only be decrypted by using a different (but matching) decryption key kd 6= ke. Thus,
even if ke is public knowledge, kd can be a secret which is only known by one person,
say i. Thus, anyone can encrypt a message (using ke) and send it to i (perhaps over an
insecure channel), but only i can decrypt the message (using kd). Encrypting a document
using ke is like putting it into a ‘sealed envelope’ which only i can open. The security
of the cryptosystem is based on the fact that, even with knowledge of ke, it is extremely
difficult to reconstruct kd —just as difficult as trying to decrypt an encrypted message by
‘brute force’. A general introduction to public key cryptography is Schneier (1996); more
technical introductions are Koblitz (1994) and Stinson (2006).
The anonymity protocol works as follows:
1. Every voter stores her voting money in an escrow account managed by a ‘vote bro-
ker’. The broker’s job is to protect the anonymity of her clients. We assume that
the existence of many private, competing brokers, each of whom depends on her
reputation for trustworthiness to attract clients.
2. Before each referendum, the Electoral Commission (EC) generates an encryption key
ke and corresponding decryption key kd, and publishes ke.
3. To vote, you record your valuations for each alternative in A, and encrypt this
document using ke. You then pass this encrypted vote to your broker.
4. On your behalf, your broker sends your encrypted votes to the EC, along with the
current balance of your voting money account (but does not reveal your identity).
5. The EC decrypts your vote using kd. If the difference between your maximum val-
uation and minimum valuation is greater than the current balance of your voting
money account, then the vote is rejected as invalid.
6. The Electoral Commission (EC) aggregates all the valid valuations it received from
all brokers, and computes the total valuation for each alternative. The EC then
publicly announces these totals. The alternative with the highest total valuation is
chosen.
7. The EC computes Clarke taxes for each (anonymous) voter, as in eqn.(3), and com-
municates this information to the relevant brokers. On your behalf, your broker pays
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the EC any Clarke taxes you owe, and then debits your escrow account accordingly.6
Because your vote is encrypted, no one can read your votes except the EC. Thus, your
broker cannot reveal your votes to a third party. Thus, just as with a conventional secret
ballot, it is not possible to ‘sell’ your vote (because the ‘buyer’ can’t verify how you voted).
The EC generates a new key pair (ke, kd) for each referendum to maximize cryptographic
security. (It is easy to generate many new key pairs, using a simple computation).
Because your broker communicates your vote anonymously to the EC, it is not possible
for the EC to identify a particular vote with a particular voter. Thus, it is not possible for
the government to identify and persecute people with particular political views.
If a single ‘brokerage layer’ is not deemed sufficient to protect voter anonymity, then
we can interpose multiple layers. For example, each private broker can communicate her
anonymized clients’ valuations to a private ‘metabroker’, who then communicates these
anonymized valuation bundles to a private ‘metametabroker’, who finally communicates
them to the Electoral Commission. With sufficiently many anonymizing brokerage layers,
it would be almost impossible to trace a particular valuation to a particular voter, even if
some brokers were corruptible.
The gradual replenishment of voting money accounts is also anonymized. The EC
reimburses each broker in small installments of voting money for each Clarke tax paid by
that broker. The broker then passes these reimbursements on to the appropriate client.
Presumably, the per-capita operating costs of a broker will be small. Nevertheless, each
voter could be given an (anonymous) government voucher with which to pay her brokerage
costs, so that voting imposes no financial burden.
5 Ballot Auctions
The VMPM is an attractive mechanism for democratically choosing one policy from a ballot
of alternatives. But how is this ballot created in the first place? Clearly the outcome of a
referendum is strongly influenced by the wording of the question and the list of responses
presented to the voters. An inferior or biased ballot will yield an inferior or biased outcome,
no matter how ‘democratic’ the referendum process is itself.
One possibility is for the ballots to be designed by a ‘Legislative Committee’. But how
should we select the members of this Committee? The electoral systems presently used in
most democracies are less than satisfactory, and frequently degenerate into puerile popu-
larity contests and partisan publicity stunts. We could use the VMPM itself to elect the
members of the Legislative Committee, but how would we nominate the list of candidates
for this VMPM-based election? In modern democracies, most candidates are nominated
by organized political parties, so that meaningful participation in government is restricted
6Note that, from the EC’s public announcement, you can easily compute your own Clarke taxes, so
your broker cannot cheat you.
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to an exclusive club of loyal party apparatchiks.7
Instead of relying on a Legislative Committee to design the referenda, we could allow
any citizen to propose a new referendum question, to add a new response to the ballot
of an existing referendum, or to propose an amendment to an existing response (we will
refer to any of these three possibilities as a ballot initiative). However, this would lead to a
bewildering profusion of thousands of referenda, each containing thousands of alternatives.
Many referendum questions would be ambiguous or severely biased; many responses on each
ballot would be incomplete, incoherent, poorly designed, and/or poorly articulated, and
many more would be frivolous variations upon one another. In the VMPM, ‘vote-splitting’
is no longer a concern, but information overload is a universal problem. Furthermore, any
interest group which lost a referendum could simply keep reintroducing new referenda on
the same topic until it got its way.
We could require anyone proposing a ballot initiative to pay a fee (which is made as
large as necessary to keep manageable the number of referenda and the number of responses
on each referendum). However, this method obviously favours the ballot initiatives of the
wealthy. Alternately, we could require each ballot initiative to be supported by petition
with some minimum number of signatures. But signatures are cheap and easy to obtain
(and difficult to verify).
A better method is to combine these two methods: we could implicitly require a ‘peti-
tion’ in support of each initiative, manifested by a ‘fee’ paid in voting money. For example,
suppose the fee to add a new response to the ballot of an existing referendum was one hun-
dred voting dollars (and each person’s endowment was one dollar). To pay this fee, you
would need to exhaust the voting money endowments at least one hundred people. Thus,
to successfully add a new response to a ballot, you must either obtain extremely strong
support from a coalition of one hundred people (expressed in an unfalsifiable manner by
expending their entire political capital), or you must obtain a weaker expression of support
from all members of a larger coalition (e.g. a donation of 10 ‘voting cents’ from each of a
thousand supporters). The fee to introduce an entirely new referendum would be consid-
erably larger (say, one thousand voting dollars), so it would require an even larger show of
public support.
Since these fees are paid in voting money, this system does not favour wealthy vested
interests. Instead, it favours coalitions which can mobilize sufficient popular political
support around their ballot initiative. The fees should be made large enough to keep the
number of ballot initiatives manageable, without becoming so large that they altogether
suppress popular political participation. Indeed, instead of charging a fixed fee, the best
approach is to hold a public auction for the right to introduce a ballot initiative.
For example, suppose there are to be 52 referendums per year (i.e. one per week).
Then every week, the Electoral Commission (EC) will hold an auction, and the winner of
7In principle, any citizen can nominate herself as an ‘independent’ candidate, by paying a candidacy fee
and/or obtaining sufficiently many signatures on petition. In practice, without the backing of a political
party and its well-financed campaign machine, she is almost certain to lose the election.
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this auction will dictate the question for the referendum to be held exactly 26 weeks later.
Furthermore, suppose that we decide that there should be an average of ten responses on
the ballot of each referendum (perhaps more on some and less on others). Then in each
weekly auction, the EC will sell ten ‘response licenses’, each of which gives its owner the
right to add one response to the ballot of any referendum to be held between 10 and 20
weeks hence (this provides at least six weeks to prepare responses after a given referendum
question is announced, and also provides at least ten weeks for voters to consider all the
responses to each referendum). Any response licenses unsold in a particular week will
remain available for sale in following weeks (hence, in some weekly auctions, there may be
more than ten licenses available for sale). Presumably, concerned citizens will pool their
voting money and form coalitions which bid in these auctions, obtain licenses, and then
introduce various ballot initiatives.
A standard printed page contains about 4000 printed characters (counting all letters,
punctuation, and whitespace). Suppose we decide that on average, referendum questions
(including explanatory preamble, etc.) should be no more than 1000 printed characters
in length (i.e. a quarter page), and that each response (including clarifying clauses and
supplementary information) should, on average, be no more than 2000 characters in length
(i.e. half a page). Thus, the ballot for an average referendum would be less than 21000
characters in total (i.e. five or six pages). In this case, we can initially give the winner of
each referendum auction the right to dictate a 500 character question, and the winner of
each response license the right to dictate a 1000 character response. During each weekly
auction, the EC will sell an additional 500 ‘question characters’ (which can be used to
increase the length of a referendum question), and an additional 10000 ‘response characters’
(which can be used to increase the length of a response). For example, a coalition proposing
an 800 character referendum question must also purchase 300 question characters, while
a coalition introducing a 1400 character response must likewise purchase 400 response
characters. Any characters unsold during a particular week will remain available for sale
in following weeks.
This ‘Ballot Auction’ system has three major advantages over referendum design by a
Legislative Committee:
1. The Ballot Auction totally democratizes the process of referendum design, while still
keeping the result manageable.
2. Like the VMPM itself, the Ballot Auction is politically egalitarian, and does not
favour wealthy vested interests or party apparatchiks.
3. By making voting money fungible for the right to propose new legislation, we have in-
creased the utility of voting money (perhaps greatly). This may obviate the problem
raised in Remark 9(R) of §3.
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Remark 10: (a) Note that the aforementioned length limitations only apply to the text
of the ballot (i.e. the question and responses). First, the coalition behind a ballot initiative
can publish as much supplementary information as it desires, clarifying, justifying, and
promoting its initiative. It can create a web page, mail out leaflets, or buy advertising
space. Second, two thousand characters will clearly not be sufficient to completely and
precisely encode a complex piece of legislation. The two thousand character response
which appears on the ballot should be seen as a legally binding declaration of intent to
draft a longer and more detailed legal text. Following the referendum, this legal text should
be drafted by a team of lawyers (hired by the government, but presumably approved by the
coalition which originally proposed the winning response). When it is finished, this legal
text should then approved by an independent tribunal of judges, who should determine
whether it represents a fair and accurate legal expression of the original wording of the
winning response.
(b) After the ‘licenses’ and ‘characters’ are sold in the initial auctions, we cannot
allow them to be resold. A resale market would create the opportunity for speculators to
accumulate disproportionately large quantities of voting money, thereby undermining the
intended political egalitarianism of the VMPM.
(c) To avoid the possibility of coordination failure (see below), we stipulate that each
coalition must return to its contributing members any voting money it fails to spend on
their behalf. The purpose of a coalition is to purchase licenses by bidding in an auction.
If the coalition fails in this purpose, then it spends no money, and it must return to each
member her entire contribution.
A formal model of these ballot auctions is beyond the scope of this paper, but we will
offer an outline. Such a formal model must address at least four questions:
(a) How do coalitions form?
(b) How is the text of a ballot initiative determined by a coalition?
(c) How do the auctions work?
(d) How does the use of voting money in ballot auctions affect the conclusion of Lemma
2, that each voter’s utility function is ‘approximately quasilinear’ in voting money?
The main issue in (a) is whether nascent coalitions will encounter coordination failures
or free riding. Remark 10(c) stipulated that each coalition must return any unused voting
money to its contributors. In particular, no contributor risks losing any money if the
coalition fails to purchase the licenses it requires due to insufficient funds. Thus, each
potential contributor’s decision about whether and how much to contribute is independent
of her beliefs about the actions of other contributors. This eliminates the threat of a
coordination failure.
Nevertheless, free riding may be a problem, because a successful ballot initiative is a
public good: a supporter of this initiative will benefit equally from the coalition’s success
whether she personally contributes or not. However, this differs from a standard public
good problem in three ways:
25
1. The success of a ballot initiative is all-or-nothing. Unlike, say, the success of a public
park, it is not a continuously increasing function of the level of funding.
2. A contributor only pays if the initiative is successful; she pays nothing if it fails.
3. As discussed under (b) below, a contributor can exert some control over the text of
the initiative, by making her contribution conditional on certain amendments. Thus,
by contributing, she obtains some degree of ‘ownership’ (unlike a truly public good).
If coalitions suffer from free riding, then they will have smaller budgets, and will necessarily
make smaller bids in auctions. However, to succeed in its ballot initiative, a coalition
merely has to out-bid other, competing coalitions, so if all coalitions are equally aﬄicted
by free riding, then no coalition is especially disadvantaged, and its success or failure in
the auctions will be more or less the same as if there was no free riding at all.
The problem is that some coalitions may suffer from more free riding than others. For
example, suppose ballot initiative A is favoured by a small, homogeneous, politically ex-
treme group, while initiative B is favoured by a much larger, heterogeneous, and politically
moderate group. In this case, Olson (1965) has observed that the coalition promoting B
will likely suffer more free riding than the coalition promoting A. If Olson’s analysis is
applicable, then extremist minorities may exert disproportionate influence over the text of
referendum ballots. This influence will perhaps be countered by the fact that the whole
electorate (dominated by a moderate majority) will decide the outcomes of these referenda.
In the simplest model of (b), some person or group first finalizes the text for a ballot
initiative, and then tries to gather together a coalition to financially support this initiative.
However, in a more realistic model, each coalition member may make her contribution
conditional on certain amendments to the text of the initiative. Thus, the ultimate text
of the initiative arises out of some process of multilateral bargaining within the coalition,
where the bargaining strength of each coalition member is perhaps proportional the Shapley
Value (1953) of her financial contribution towards the coalition’s bid. A precise model of
this bargaining process must explicitly represent how the utility function of each coalition
member depends upon the text of the ballot initiative.
To answer (c), one could draw on the theory of auctions; see McAfee and McMillan
(1987) or Milgrom (1989). Presumably, the licenses should go to the coalitions which have
the most intense political preferences; thus, the auction mechanism should elicit truthful
revelation of preference intensity from each bidder. One obvious choice would be Vickrey’s
(1961) second-price, sealed bid auction.
To answer (d), one must replace the utility function (7) with a utility function ui :
A0 × B˜−→[0, 1], where
B˜ :=
⋃{ N∏
n=1
An ; A1, . . . ,AN is any sequence of possible future
referenda, with any questions and responses
}
.
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The success or failure of various ballot initiatives determines which possible sequence of
future referenda is actually realized. Voter i can then vote on this particular sequence of
referenda, using the VMPM. Her utility function mi over voting money is thus induced by
her utility function over B˜ in two ways:
(i) As in Lemma 2, her money enables her to participate in the VMPM, which contributes
infinitesimally to the probabilities that her preferred alternatives will win the refer-
enda.
(ii) Voter i’s contributions help to determine the success or failure of ballot initiatives,
which in turn determines which future referenda will actually occur.
Lemma 2 used Taylor’s theorem to show that the utility function induced by (i) was
‘approximately quasilinear’. A similar method could probably be applied to (ii), if we
assume that each contributor’s effect on the success of a ballot initiative is small enough.
The difficulty here is that B˜ is an infinite set, so that the space [0, 1]B˜ of voting money
allocations is infinite-dimensional. This makes it difficult to compute an expected utility
with an integral like eqn.(6), and means that Taylor’s theorem doesn’t apply without
further technical restrictions. Furthermore, if B˜ is infinite, then the utility function βi :
B˜−→R could be unbounded in hypothesis (S) of §3; we must exclude this possibility or
else g (and thus, the function mi) could become infinite.
6 Concluding remarks
Other point voting systems. Systems where citizens vote by allocating a budget of ‘voting
money’ are at least a century old; the earliest known description is Charles Dodgson’s
(1873) ‘Method of Marks’. Musgrave (1959) briefly sketched a system of ‘point voting’
[p.130-131], while Coleman (1970) suggested that a currency of ‘fungible votes’ could su-
persede vote-trading just as money superseded barter [§III(b), p.1084]. ‘Point voting’ was
also suggested by Mueller (1971, 1973), and is implicit in ‘probabilistic’ voting schemes like
Intriligator (1973) and Nitzan (1975), as well as in the ‘Walrasian equilibrium’ model of
vote-trading proposed by Mueller (1967, 1973) and studied in Philpotts (1971, 1972) and
Mueller et al. (1972).
However, without some mechanism to encourage honesty, each voter will misrepresent
her preferences; this was recognized by Dodgson (1873) and Mueller (1973, 1977), and
further studied by Laine (1977), Nitzan et al. (1980) and Nitzan (1985). For example, in
allocating her voting money over the alternatives of a single ballot, each voter might simply
pile all her money onto her most-preferred alternative amongst the subset of alternatives
she considers most likely to win (in particular, she may not allocate any money towards
her favourite alternative, if she considers it doomed to lose). Thus, her allocation will not
accurately represent her utility function.
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Allen (1977, 1982) proposed a ‘modified method of marks’ (MMM), where, instead of
allocating a fixed ‘budget’ of voting money, voters can give each alternative any numerical
score within a certain range (like the VMPM, but without Clarke taxes). Allen claimed
his MMM was less susceptible to strategic misrepresentation than Dodgson’s Method of
Marks, but this was refuted by Hardin (1982). (Indeed, we earlier argued that the MMM
would in fact devolve into ‘approval voting’).
Theorem 3 shows that the truth-revealing property of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
eliminates this problem of strategic misrepresentation of preferences, as long as voters must
reuse the same budget of voting money (minus any Clarke taxes) to vote on a sequence
of consecutive referenda. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) have proposed another ‘point-
based’ voting system which truthfully reveals each voter’s preferences for public goods. In
the Hylland-Zeckhauser system, each voter has a budget of ‘points’ which she can allocate
towards voting for various public expenditures. The amount of government money spent
on each public expenditure is then proportional to the sum of the square roots of the
point scores it receives from all voters8. Like the Groves-Clarke mechanism, the Hylland-
Zeckhauser mechanism makes it optimal for voters to truthfully reveal their preferences,
and implements a utilitarian outcome. Like the VMPM (but unlike Groves-Clarke), the
Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism relies on voting money rather than real money, so it does
not favour wealthy voters. However, the Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism is only designed
for allocating a finite budget of resources amongst various preapproved public expenditures;
it is not appropriate for making discrete, all-or-nothing choices between policies or between
government candidates. Also, the Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism relies on an iterative
process (where voters repeatedly receive feedback and modify their votes), and it is not
guaranteed that this iterative process will converge.
Vote-trading. It is well-known that vote-trading (‘logrolling’) can yield Pareto-improving
outcomes. Each voter buys votes on issues of greater importance to her by selling her
vote on issues of lesser importance; hence vote-trading allows ‘ordinal’ voting systems
like plurality vote to indirectly detect ‘cardinal utility’ information. This was observed by
Buchanan and Tullock (1990 [1962]), Coleman (1966), Mueller (1973) and Schwartz (1975),
and confirmed in computer simulations by Philpotts (1971, 1972) and Mueller et al. (1972).
However, Tullock (1959) and Brams and Riker (1973) have constructed examples where
vote trading perversely leads to Pareto-inferior outcomes9, as well as ‘cyclical trading’
scenarios wherein three or more factions endlessly trade votes on three or more referenda
without ever converging to equilibrium10.
It is tempting to think that the voting money of the VMPM could be embedded in some
kind of ‘currency exchange’, thereby implementing the ‘Walrasian’ vote-trading mechanism
of Mueller (1967); this could enable Pareto-improving vote-trades while avoiding perverse
8See §8.3, p.170 of Mueller (2003) for details. See also §4 of Tideman (1997).
9See Chapt. 10 of Buchanan and Tullock (1990 [1962]), §6E, p.161 of Riker (1982), §4.6, p.137 of
Brams (2003 [1975]), or p.13 of Jones (1988).
10See §4.7, p.140 of Brams (2003 [1975]) or §5.9, p.107 of Mueller (2003).
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or cyclical outcomes. However, as observed by Philpotts (1971) and Mueller (1973), such
a currency exchange is again vulnerable to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. In
allocating her voting money between different referenda, each voter will simply concentrate
all her money on the referendum where it yields the highest expected utility gain, either
because this is the issue where she holds the strongest preferences, or because this is the
most closely contested ballot, where she has the highest chance of casting a pivotal vote.
Either way, her distribution of voting money will not accurately reflect the intensities of
her preferences on the different issues.
Nevertheless, the VMPM provides a mechanism whereby each voter can divert her
‘political capital’ from issues of lesser importance to her, so as to concentrate it on issues
of greater importance, thereby achieving an outcome similar to a Pareto-improving vote
trade. For example, suppose there are two referenda, A0 and A1, and that, in equation (7),
voter i’s utility function ui : A0 ×A1−→R can be written as ui(a0, a1) = w0(a0) +w1(a1),
where w0 : A0−→[0, 1] and w1 : A1−→[0, 1] are her utility functions over the two referenda
considered separately. Suppose that her preferences over referendum A1 are ‘ten times as
intense’ as her preferences over A0. For example, if max[w1(A1)] − min[w1(A1)] = 0.8,
then max[w0(A0)] − min[w0(A0)] = 0.08. Suppose that, when voting in the VMPM, i
declares valuations v0 : A0−→[0, 1] and v1 : A1−→[0, 1]. Corollary 6 predicts that v0 and
v1 will be discrepancy-minimizing, which means that max[v1(A1)]−min[v1(A1)] ≈ 0.8 and
max[v0(A0)] − min[v0(A0)] ≈ 0.08. Thus, voter i will bid ten times more money on A1
than on A0. In other words, she willingly cedes her political influence (in a sense, ‘selling
her vote’) over A0, so as to preserve her voting money for more important referenda like
A1.
Preferences versus judgements. Jones (1988) compares point voting with several other
ways that ‘preference intensity’ can influence public decisions, such as logrolling, pressure
group activity, and electioneering. However, he questions the admissibility of subjective
preference intensity into public decisions which also depend upon objective ‘judgements’
about matters of fact. Jones briefly entertains the possibility of a point voting system
where a voter’s point allocation expresses not only the intensity of her ‘preferences’, but
also her confidence in her ‘judgements’. However, such a system is clearly vulnerable to
strategic exaggeration (of both intensity and confidence).
Nevertheless, the VMPM does indirectly measure each voter’s ‘confidence’. To see
this, suppose that the utility function wi : A0−→[0, 1] in eqn.(8) arises as follows. Let
X be set of possible ‘states of the world’, and suppose that i has a joint utility function
Ui : A0 ×X−→[0, 1]. Let µ be a probability measure on X. We assume:
(a) For all x ∈ X, max
a∈A0
Ui(a, x) − min
a∈A0
Ui(a, x) ≈ 1.
(b) There is some constant m ∈ [0, 1] such that, for all a ∈ A0,∫
X
Ui(a, k) dµ[x] = m.
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Hypothesis (a) says that, in each specific state of the world, some alternatives are clearly
much better for i than others. However, hypothesis (b) says that all alternatives are equally
good for i, when we average their payoffs over all possible world states. (In particular, i
deems different alternatives to be optimal in different world states.)
The precise state of the world, x ∈ X, is unknown to i —her incomplete knowledge
is represented by a subset Ki ⊆ X containing x. Thus, the utility which i assigns to an
alternative a ∈ A0 is its expected utility:
wi(a) =
∫
Ki
Ui(a, k) dµ[k].
Now, if the set Ki is quite large in X (meaning that i has little confidence about her
knowledge of x), then hypothesis (b) implies that wi(a) ≈ m for all a ∈ A. Thus,
max[wi(A0)] −min[wi(A0)] ≈ m −m = 0. Thus, if i declares a discrepancy-minimizing
valuation vi : A0−→[0, 1] (as predicted by Corollary 6), then max[vi(A0)]−min[vi(A0)] ≈
0, so her vote will have little impact, due to her lack of confidence. On the other
hand, if Ki is very small (meaning that i is highly confident the she has precise knowl-
edge of x), then wi(a) ≈ Ui(a, x) for all a ∈ A, and then hypothesis (a) implies that
max[wi(A0)] − min[wi(A0)] ≈ 1. Thus, max[vi(A0)] − min[vi(A0)] ≈ 1, so her vote will
then have greater impact, reflecting her greater confidence.
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